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Here, United States v. Lincoln 4 extends this doctrine one step further
by obliterating the previous distinction between confessions and admissions, thus marking the culmination of the trend begun by Tempia, extending the protections of servicemen to include substantially all of the
protections accorded to civilians by Miranda.25 Though the contention
has been made that such an extension to servicemen would undercut
the discipline necessary for the proper functioning of the armed forces,"6
it would appear that in the future, military personnel can be assured of
the full scope of protections afforded by the first ten amendments, with
the exception of those "privileges under the Bill of Rights which by
necessary implication are inapplicable to servicemen. "27
Federal Taxation-REORGANIZATION-SPIN-OFFs--LABOR DIFFICULTIEs As A VALID BusINEss PURPosE. During 1961 and prior years taxpayers conducted, in various capacities, the business affairs of several
electronics merchandising corporations, known collectively as the Olson
Group. One of these corporations, Cleveland, owned all the stock in
States v. Bollons, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 157, 38 C.M.R. 55 (1967); and (2) that the government
has the affirmative burden to show conclusively that the accused has waived his right
to remain silent. United States v. McCauley, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 81, 37 C.M.R. 345 (1967);
United States v. Gustafson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 37 C.M.R. 414 (1967).
24. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 330, 38 C.M.R. 128 (1967).
25. Thus the accused, either serviceman or civilian, has the right to remain silent.
Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 'with 10 U..C. S 831(b). He has
the right to counsel, either retained or appointed, from the beginning of the custodial
interrogation. Campare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966), 'with United
States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). Should the government
contend that the accused waived the above rights, it must prove this waiver conclusively,
before the waiver is admitted. For counsel; compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
474 (1966), 'with United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.MA. 629, 638, 640, 37 C.M.R.
249, 258, 260 (1967); and for the right to remain silent; compare Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) with United States v. Bollons, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 253, 38 C.M.R.
51 (1967). Admissions have the same incriminating effect as confessions. Compare
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476, 477 (1966), with United States v. Lincoln, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 330, 38 C.M.R. 128 (1967). An affirmative burden is placed upon the
government to prove conclusively that the above has transpired, or the statement risks
the fate of inadmissibility as evidence. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475
(1966) 'with United States v. Gustafson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 37 C.M.R. 414 (1967) and
United States v. Solomon, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 262, 38 C.M.R. 60 (1967).
26. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A.
428, 441, 29 C.M.R. 244, 257 (1960) (dissenting opinion). See generally, Note, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 127, supra note 17. But see Henderson, Courts Martial and the Constitution: The original understanding,71 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1957).
27. See United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 633, 37 C.M.R. 249, 253 (1967).
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Buffalo, another corporation in the Olson Group. In 1960, as a result
of departures by the president of Cleveland from the personnel policies
of the Group, there were union organizing activities at Cleveland. Because of the fear that these unionizing activities might spread to the
rest of the Group and especially to Buffalo, taxpayers (the officers
and stockholders of Cleveland) authorized and had distributed the stock
of Buffalo to the stockholders of Cleveland, thereby "spinning-off"'
Buffalo. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that the distribution did not qualify for tax-exempt treatment but constituted a taxable
dividend.
The Tax Court, however, held for the taxpayers on the ground that a
valid business purpose had been shown for the spin-off.'
The tax consequences of spin-offs have varied with the successive internal revenue laws. While the spin-off was originally taxable, the Revenue Act of 19243 extended to it nonrecognition of gain status.4 Tax-free
treatment continued through the Revenue Act of 1932.1 Because these
provisions did not contain restrictions like those of the present enactment, a literal reading of the statutes made them subject to tax avoidance schemes. A corporation would form a subsidiary whose sole purpose was to hold the liquid assets of the parent corporation. The stock
in the subsidiary would be distributed to the existing corporation's
shareholders who would then liquidate the new corporation and the
gains from the assets thus sold would be taxed at capital gains rates.6
1. A spin-off is a distribution by one corporation of the stock of a subsidiary corporation. Under the 1954 Code, the stock of either an existing subsidiary or a newly
created one can qualify for a tax-free spin-off. Before 1954, however, the subsidiary had
to be created for the purpose or, if an existing subsidiary was used, the distributing
corporation was required to transfer additional assets to it as part of a plan of reorganization. B. BrrmER & J. Eusncz, FEDERAL INcoME TAxATION OF CoRPoRATI NS AND
SHAREHOLDERS § 11.01, at 450 (2d ed. 1966). The spin-off is regulated by INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 355.
2. Sidney L. Olson, 48 T.C. 855 (1967).
3. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(c), 43 Star. 256. This was done in order to
facilitate the separation of a business into units without eliminating the original corporation. 3 MERENS, FEnERAL INzCOM TAXATION § 20.100 (rev. ed. 1966); S. REP. No. 398,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,at 15 (1924).
4. For the history of tax-free spin-offs, see generally Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14, 17 (1962); Spangler v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 976, 987 (1952);
3 MERTENS, supra note 3, § 20.100.
5. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 203(c), 44 Stat. 13; Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852,
§ 112(g), 45 Star. 818; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 112(g), 47 Star. 197.
6. 3 MERTENS, supra note 3, § 20.101.
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In Gregory v. HelveriZg,7 the Supreme Court, in an effort to eliminate
these abuses, laid down the general principle that not only must there
be literal compliance with the requirements of the Code provisions but
there must also be a "business purpose" that reflects the spirit of the
section.8 While Gregory was on appeal, and before the Supreme Court
had enunciated the "business purpose' doctrine," 9 Congress, due to a
demand for the repeal of the provision granting nonrecognition treatment to spin-offs, omitted the provision from the Revenue Act of 193410
and spin-offs again became taxable.
Thereafter Congress came to believe that it was "economically unsound to impede spin-offs which break up businesses into a greater number of enterprises, when undertaken for legitimate business purposes." "
Thus in 1951 the nonrecognition provisions pertaining to spin-offs were
reinstated in section 112(b) (11) of the 1939 Code. 12 This section partially enacted the "business purpose doctrine" of Gregory'3 and included
a general prohibition against distribution of earnings and profits to share7. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
8. See Michaelson, "Business Purpose" and Tax-Free Reorganization, 61 YALE L.J.
14, 25 (1952); Rice, Judicial Tecbniques in Combatting Tax Avoidance, 51 Micn. L.
REv. 1021, 1043 (1953). This has been called the "pervasive business doctrine". 3
MERTmNS, supra note 3. § 20.101, at 498.
9. For a discussion of the Gregory doctrine, see 3 MERTENs, supra note 3, §§ 20.55 and
20.56. This doctrine is now applicable to areas of tax law not at all connected with
the spin-off provisions. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331
(1945); Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965); Bondy v. Commissioner,
269 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1959). See also Michaelson, "Business Purpose" and Tax Free
Reorganization,61 YALE L.J. 14, 25 (1952).
10. 3 MaRTENs, supra note 3, § 20.101, at 498.
11. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 58 (1951).
12. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (11), added by ch. 521, § 317(a), 65 Stat. 493
(1951). For the history of this provision, see 96 CONG. REc. 1980 (1950); Estate of
Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (1962). This section read as follows:
(11) DisTrUBUTION OF STOCK NOT IN LIQUmATION.-If there is distributed,
in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, to a shareholder of a corporation,
which is a party to the reorganization, stock (other than preferred stock)
in another corporation which is a party to the reorganization, without the
surrender by such shareholder of stock, no gain to the distributee from
the receipt of such stock shall be recognized unless it appears (A) any
corporation which is a party to such reorganization was not intended to
continue the active conduct of a trade or business after such reorganization,
or (B) the corporation whose stock is distributed was used principally as
a device for the distribution of earnings and profits to the shareholders of
any corporation a party to the reorganization.
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (11) (A), added by ch. 521, § 317(a), 65 Stat. 493
(1951) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §355(b)(1) (A)).
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holders by means of a reorganization. 4 Section 355 of the 1954 Code
substantially continues these two basic requirements. 15 The Treasury
Regulations even more clearly spell out the necessity of showing a valid
business purpose for the reorganization; otherwise the nonrecognition
provisions of section 355 are not available.'"
Here, in Sidney L. Olson,'7 the Commissioner contended that the
taxpayers had not met the requirements of section 355, because, iter
alia,18 they had failed to show a valid business purpose for the distribution of the stock in Buffalo. The Tax Court disagreed, analogizing the
differences between Cleveland and its employees to the situation where
two stockholders of a corporation, to avoid further differences and conflicts between them as to the conduct of the business, separate the assets
of the corporation between themselves, each thereafter operating a separate corporate enterprise. This latter situation has been held to constitute a valid business purpose. 19 Thus the Tax Court concluded that the
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (11) (B), added by ch. 521, S 317(a), 65 Star.
493 (1951) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §355(a) (1) (B)).
15. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 50-51 (1954). It is to be noted that
nowhere in section 355 does the phrase "business purpose" appear as a requirement for
a tax-free spin-off. The section does require, however, that the distribution not be
"used principally as a device for the distribution of the earnings and profits of the
distributing corporation or the controlled corporation or both." INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 355(a) (1) (B). Moreover the distribution must not be "in pursuance of a plan
having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax." INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a) (1) (D) (ii).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1955). Even if there is no tax avoidance motive, a
reorganization having no business purpose has been held not to be entitled to the nonrecognition provisions of section 355. Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (1965).
As examples of business purposes which might support a tax-free distribution under
section 355, in B. BITrKER & J. Eus-ricE, supra note 1, at 484, there are listed the following: (1) Compliance with local law requiring two businesses to be separated.
(2) Compliance with federal anti-trust law. (3) Segregation of hazardous activities in
a separate corporation. (4) Separation of a business to permit its employees to share
in profits or ownership. (5) Settlement of a shareholder dispute, by giving each group
of shareholders control or ownership of one business.
17. Sidney L. Olson, 48 T.C. 855 (1967).
18. The Commissioner also argued that the transfer of the Buffalo shares to trusts
for the stockholders" wives coupled with the fact that Buffalo first began paying dividends in 1960 indicated this was a plan to avoid tax on the dividends by shifting income to the trusts. The Tax Court disposed of this contention, holding that section
355 (a) (1) (B) provides that a subsequent sale of the stock, which is not agreed to,
before the distribution, does not destroy the tax free nature of the transaction. Besides,
the statute contains no such limitation on transfers of stock to a trust. The Court
added that, even if these restrictions applied, here the taxpayers would prevail since
there was no evidence of a prior agreement. Sidney L. Olson, 48 T.C. 855 (1967).
19. Albert W. Badanes, 39 T.C. 410, 415 (1962), petition for resiew dismissed (6th

1194

WILLIAM AND

IARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1162

avoidance of conflicts between Cleveland and its employees and the
possible spread of these difficulties to Buffalo and its employees constituted a valid business purpose for the distribution. 0
The result would seem to be in accord with the intent of Congress
in enacting section 35 5. As Congress felt it was "economically unsound
to impede spin-offs 'when undertaken for legitimate business purposes," 21
tax-exempt treatment should be given when such a "legitimate business
purpose" is shown. Furthermore, both Government and business favor
the separation of large concerns into smaller units when done for a valid
business purpose.22 True, the Government, as well as most taxpayers for
that matter, is opposed to tax avoidance,2 3 but conflicts of these interests
can best be met by a close scrutiny of the business reasons behind the
transaction, provided the literal requirements of the statute are met.
WVhere, as in Olson, these requirements are met, regard should be given
to congressional intent and the gain should not be recognized.

Cir. 1963). Cf. Edmund P. Coady, 33 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'd 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir.
1961); W.E. Gabriel Fabrication Co., 42 T.C. 545 (1964). See also B. BrrrxER & J.
EusncE, supra note 1, at 484; Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-1 Cum,,. BULL. 77.
20. Sidney L. Olson, 48 T.C. 955 (1967).
21. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., Ist Sess., 58 (1951) (Emphasis added). It is to be
noted that, had this been considered an unfair labor practice, the result could have
gone the other way on the basis that it would be against public policy to allow this to
constitute a valid business purpose. But this would not necessarily be so since "the
federal income tax is a tax on net income, not a sanction against wrongdoing." Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966). In this regard, see also 50 CoNG. REc. 3849
(1913) as to congressional intent in the first income tax bill. But see 4A MERTE-,S,
supra note 3, §§ 25.49ff.
22. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934). See generally B. BIT-rER
& J. EusncE, supra note 1, S§ 11.02, 12.01; 3 MERTNs, supra note 3, S 20.101.
23. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); IN-r. REv. CODE OF 1954, S 355(a)
(1) (B); 3 MRTENS, supra note 3, § 20.103.

